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I, posthuman: A deliberately provocative title
Abstract
In this paper, I explore the use of posthumanism as a theoretical framework for 
autoethnography, and show the methodological tensions of combining these approaches. A 
posthuman subjectivity rejects notions of the liberal human subject and anthropocentrism by 
recognising the entanglement of humanity. Acknowledging a posthuman subjectivity means 
taking account of our constantly intra-connected and transient relationship with our 
environment and others within it, both human and non-human (e.g. Braidotti, 2013). On the 
other hand, authoethnographic approaches to research propose self-reflection and personal 
experience as the basis on which new theoretical insight can be gained. From a critical 
perspective, “[t]he very idea of autobiography relies on a subject (or a narrator) who is 
capable of remembering, interpreting and identifying with his or her life story” (Herbrechter, 
2012, p.331). Using a posthumanist framework through autoethnographic research means that 
the “I” is precarious at best; so how and why can we utilise it to explore such a phenomenon 
as the posthuman? This paper argues that such tensions provide insights into the formation of 
subjectivity, where “I” is both fallacy and necessity. It explores this methodological tension 
through an 18-month autoethnographic project that explores my own experiences of 
gameplay in the massively multiplayer online role-playing game (MMORPG) World of 
Warcraft (WoW). Using fieldnotes collected during this period, I discuss what a posthuman 
perspective can bring to an account of my relationship with my avatar, Etyme. 
Keywords
Posthumanism, posthuman, methodology, autoethnography, cyber, MMORPG, avatar, gamer.
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I, posthuman: A deliberately provocative title
Introduction
When presenting some aspects of my work at conferences I know it will be my methodology 
that will come under fire. Recently, during my paper at a seminar, someone used Twitter to 
question whether it was possible to understand something using “only” autoethnography. 
This standpoint is an oft-encountered critique of the validity of autoethnography (see for 
example, To, 2015; Ellis et al., 2010) yet always baffles me – we wouldn’t say “only” an 
interview, or ever dismiss participants’ experiences in the way some people seem to suggest 
that we should dismiss our own. However, more than these responses to autoethnography in 
general, my particular, posthuman use of the methodology elicits, and, it could be argued, 
requires, further, more complex consideration.
Posthumanism is an expanding field of study, with a variety of theorisations, 
embodiments and understandings. Hayles’ (1999) use of the posthuman suggested that 
“subjectivity is emergent rather than given, distributed rather than located solely in 
consciousness, emerging from and integrated into a chaotic world rather than occupying a 
position of mastery and control removed from it” (p. 291). In my research, the massively 
multiplayer online role-playing game (MMORPG) avatar-gamer is used as an example of 
posthuman subjectivity in order to critically consider this phenomenon and analyse how 
posthuman subjectivity is facilitated and experienced. This research utilises an 
autoethnographic methodology; however, as I go on to show, there are various tensions 
within an autoethnographic accounting for posthumanism. If subjectivity is emergent and 
distributed as Hayles claims, wouldn’t an autoethnographic accounting suggest a position of 
“mastery” in writing about it? In this paper, I explore these tensions, and consider how we 
might conceive of a posthuman approach to autoethnography that displaces the stability of 
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the term “I”, even whilst using it. Throughout self-reflexive fieldnotes, the relationship 
between Etyme (my avatar) and myself demonstrates the capacity of such intra-actions to 
break down the ontologically distinct avatar and “I.” It is with these accounts of a posthuman 
subjectivity that I argue an autoethnographic account presents anything but a fixed and 
permanent sense of self awareness, coherence, and individuality. Instead what is 
demonstrated through the analysis is the intra-dependence of both human and non-human on 
the other, which takes time to adjust to and theorise:
There is a constant flow between me and Etyme as one and as two. Like any 
subjectivity this a co-construction. I’m still intrigued though, by just how complicated 
and blurred the boundaries of self and other have become.
Our entangled subjectivity means that one can only exist through the other, and vice versa. In 
this paper, I argue that such a posthuman subjectivity is only accessible through accounts of 
the “I.”
The risk in this methodological tension is to present the self as operating from a 
position of control, knowledge, and anthropocentrism. However, the “grammatical fiction” of 
“I” (Deleuze, 1991) is both performed and decentred in research contexts that already 
problematise the liberal subject (p. 95). In this regard, the research hopes to disrupt the 
humanist centrality of the author, by demonstrating how that “I” is experienced in a 
permeable fluidity with a range of different external stimuli.
Below, I begin with some exploration of the theoretical framework of posthumanism 
in order to uncover its most pertinent factors and to propose my justification for viewing the 
MMORPG avatar-gamer as posthuman subjectivity. I then explore the tensions of combining 
these perspectives with an autoethnographic method. In order to explore these arguments, I 
draw on my fieldnotes throughout to demonstrate the entangled “I” in practice and argue for 
its insights.
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Autoethnographies are about bringing personal lived experience, rigorous cultural 
analysis, and emotive forms of representation together in research in order to create 
accessible texts that provide “evocative thick descriptions of personal and interpersonal 
experience” (Ellis et al. 2010: n.p.n.). This essay therefore draws on autoethnographic styles, 
interweaving fieldnotes that capture the lived experience of gaming with an analytical 
framing and discussion. These fieldnotes were developed by drafting short notes during 
gameplay to capture key moments without disrupting the game experience, which I then 
wrote up immediately following the gameplay session. Although I do not utilise a fully 
narrative, “evocative” style of writing throughout the article, as per To (2015) “I find the 
‘academic’ voice quite useful and helpful in articulating what is needed for a more 
conceptual discussion” (p. 71). Indeed, in negotiating for more evocative, embodied, and 
subjective texts, I do not believe that leads to a disavowal of the efficacy of academic texts, 
which are themselves affectively written (see Ferreday, 2009, p. 31).
Posthuman Paradigms
Posthumanism “comes in different flavours” with a variety of interpretations, and it is 
therefore necessary to give some context for the way in which I understand posthuman 
subjectivity (Roden, 2015, p. 20). The account provided below focusses specifically on the 
interpretations that align with my use of the term, in order to situate the reader in this context, 
briefly exploring posthumanism’s rejection of the liberal humanist, the disavowal of humans 
as fixed, stable entities, and the post-anthropocentrism that therefore follows. 
In my research I argue that the MMORPG avatar-gamer represents an embodiment of 
posthuman subjectivity wherein the distinctions between avatar and gamer collapse, forming 
a notion of an entangled “self,” as I explain further below. However, before I focus on this it 
is important to state that in my use of posthumanism I do not only view the posthuman as one 
who is technologically mediated. As Tufekci (2012) argues “we were always posthuman,” 
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that is to say we have always reached beyond the boundaries of our own skin, have always 
formed relationships with human and non-human others (p. 34). The posthuman view 
acknowledges and embraces the ontological inseparability of components of “self,” “other,” 
and “environment.” This forces “a displacement of the lines of demarcation between 
structural differences, or ontological categories, for instance between the organic and the 
inorganic, the born and the manufactured, flesh and metal, electronic circuits and organic 
nervous systems” (Braidotti, 2013, p. 89). I explore this in a technological context, however, 
as the below aspects of posthumanism demonstrate, this is not integral to posthuman 
subjectivity.
Whilst relationships with technology form part of the rationale for the posthuman 
turn, they are far from the only instigating factor and posthumanism has a complex and 
multifaceted basis informed by the critique of what or who the “human” is and how they 
“should” behave. Historically, the Enlightenment humanist legacy focussed on “the progress 
of mankind through a self-regulatory and teleological ordained use of reason and of secular 
scientific rationality allegedly aimed at the perfectibility of ‘Man’” (Braidotti, 2013, p. 37). 
The humanist focus on autonomy, responsibility and self-determination amounts to an idea 
that we are “in control,” self-regulating, independent beings.
Much of the basic premise of the idea of a human being individual, autonomous and 
fully in control of their own thoughts and actions has, in more recent years, come into 
question. This idea of the “rational” being can be linked to the “fiction of autonomous 
selfhood” (Blackman, 2017). As Blackman (2017) explains, “[t]his fiction is one that 
assumes that the human subject is ideally bounded, responsible for their actions, self-
enclosed and able to develop or enact the capacity for change and transformation through 
their own agency” (n.p.n.) and as such has “become part and parcel of how we are governed 
and managed as citizens and populations” (Blackman, 2008, p. 113). The rational, 
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autonomous being is therefore a particular construction designed to suit a particular style of 
governmentality; by making the subject accountable they are also made controllable. As 
Rose (2001) suggests, “individuals may be made responsible through their individual choices 
for themselves and those to whom they owe allegiance, through the shaping of a lifestyle 
according to grammars of living that are widely disseminated, yet do not depend upon 
political calculations and strategies for their rationales or for their techniques” (p. 57). Thus, 
by being made accountable for our actions, we must be responsible for their consequences 
also, which ultimately leads into a self-regulated form of control wherein we are bound by 
the expectations around us, despite our apparent “freedom.”
What the rational subject of humanism does not acknowledge is the much more 
porous, dispersed, intra-connected aspects of “being” that influence our daily existence. We 
are constantly entwined with others – human and non-human – around us, and this 
recognition has led to a renewed understanding of what we are affected by and how we are 
moved; the way that our embodiment extends beyond our skin shows that the idea of the 
boundaries that separate “us” from the rest of the world are flawed when taking into 
perspective our distributed awareness and agency. 
This entwinement is experienced in relation to technology to such an extent that 
“[c]lear distinctions between what is real and what is virtual, where the body ends and 
technology begins, what is nature and what is machine, fracture and implode” (Toffoletti, 
2007, p. 2). When videogaming, for example, the avatar is not only a visual “embodiment” 
within the gameworld; an affective embodiment is also experienced through the avatar-gamer 
subjectivity, wherein the gamer is often viscerally moved in response to acts upon the avatar 
body (see author, 2017, for my work in this area). As Toffoletti (2007) states, digital 
technologies are becoming more integrated into our everyday existence and bodies, 
expediting the fundamental reconsideration of how we conceive of the “human” as an 
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ontologically distinct category (p. 2). 
In a posthuman view, rather than considering the human as the main benefactor in 
utilising and adapting the “other,” be that technology, the environment, animals, etc. we 
instead consider that rather than these “others” being “extensions,” they are in fact implicitly 
part of what it is to be human: “that what defines humanness or humanicity to use Vicki 
Kirby’s (2011) term is our mixed natures and that we are composite anthropods” (Blackman, 
2017, n.p.n.). Barad (2007) similarly claims entities are not distinct but are “entangled” and 
lack self-contained existence. Barad’s (2007) work explores the notion of phenomena as “the 
ontological inseparability of agentially intra-acting ‘components’” (p. 148). In Barad’s terms, 
the human does not operate outside or aside from technology. Instead, rather than two 
distinct categories of subject and object “inter”acting, components “intra”act, meaning that 
the ability to act emerges from within entanglements rather than from outside of them (Barad, 
2007). Responsibility is distributed and agency emerges as an ability to act within a certain 
context. This acknowledgement allows us to consider these relationships as a mutual 
exchange in a more rhizomatic understanding of the perceived importance of the conjoined, 
intermingled, intra-acting elements, as considered through the following researcher fieldnote, 
based on my musings around the interplay of theory and practice in my own experiences.
It’s interesting how the interpretation of the agency of the avatar is perceived in 
terms of their characteristics, and the ways in which as a player you can either 
contradict this with your actions or you can work with it. I’m thinking of the ways in 
which I view things as being appropriate or not to Etyme. On the one hand that could 
be considered as my agency overpowering that of the avatar, but I don’t experience it 
that way or feel that to be the case. Rather, I would suggest that the game narrative 
and game environment have agental affects upon my experience which guide me 
towards particular decisions and choices and away from others. This is in keeping 
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with not considering agency to be a possessed quality, but rather as a series of intra-
acting intra-dependent notions allowing for the emergence of this subjectivity. So the 
production of the game, the environment and sounds and aesthetic of where Blood 
Elves start their WoW journey, along with the narrative of the game which tells a 
complementary story to this, as well as Etyme and “I” our“selves,” have all stayed 
with me and almost unconsciously guide my opinion of Etyme being quite at one with 
nature. This is reflected in my own choices - e.g. clothing Etyme in browns and 
greens and greys, organic colours, but under closer inspection I cannot claim that 
these are my agentic choices. Instead, I have been influenced by all of the other intra-
acting components.
As a result of this acknowledgement that we are not stable unitary subjects unaffected 
by our interactions with “others” we have begun to recognise that an anthropocentric attitude 
is also flawed. As stated above, our reliance on all things “other” demonstrates the 
entanglement of the “human.” How can we claim that we are the centre of the universe, when 
we rely so heavily on our environment to thrive? Without air, food, water, and shelter as a 
basic minimum we would not survive. To believe that humans are the centre of the universe 
is a fallacy, and in recognising our reliance on the “others” around us we can begin to 
develop a more complex and, hopefully, a less hierarchical understanding of humans’ place 
in the world.
The entanglement that I suggest gamers experience with their avatars and the 
subjectivity that arises therein is therefore just one example of emotional, physical, and 
cognitive distribution. Digital games have brought about an interesting development in the 
study of our engagement with technology. Whilst by no means the only medium that 
posthuman subjectivity could be explored through, the medium provides a very specific and 
very explicit aspect of becoming engaged with technology in ways that makes our 
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entanglement both obvious and, therefore, hard to deny. In this example, this is a 
technologically mediated posthuman subjectivity; however, that is not to say that the same 
principles cannot be applied in other contexts, or that other examples would not prove to be 
just as illuminating. By using gaming as a context to explore the lived experience of a 
posthuman subjectivity I am able to consider how we can critically examine the avatar-gamer 
to see how this subjectivity is constructed and accounted for, in posthuman-autoethnographic 
ways that acknowledge our multiplicity yet speak from the position of an “I.”
Below, I recap some of the pertinent factors of an autoethnographic approach. 
Considering these in light of the above posthuman framework, I then explore the tensions in 
a posthuman autoethnography, before going on to justify this approach.
An autoethnographic Accounting
Ellis et al. (2010) position autoethnography as “one of the approaches that 
acknowledges and accommodates subjectivity, emotionality, and the researcher’s influence 
on research, rather than hiding from these matters or assuming they don’t exist” (n.p.n.). In 
autoethnographies the writer/researcher is therefore used as a tool, “as an object of 
description, analysis, and/or interpretation” (Chang, 2008, p. 35), and so it is my (entangled) 
experiences within the game environment that form the data for my research. Ellis et al. 
(2010) state that a reflexive ethnography aims to describe the ways in which a deep 
immersion in a particular cultural context affects the researcher, facilitating articulation and 
understanding of the impact of environment on being, by acknowledging personal experience 
as a valid form of data collection and interpretation. I have therefore used the techniques of 
autoethnography to explore my intimate and affective engagement with a gameworld and 
with a specific avatar, and in this article I utilise those fieldnotes to examine the ways in 
which this writing style can accommodate the notion of singularity in the face of multiplicity 
(Blackman, 2012, p. 2). This therefore utilises my (entangled) experiences but applies them 
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to a broader field of study to demonstrate a negotiation of posthuman autoethnography that 
may be utilised by others exploring this terrain.
Autoethnography’s focus on highly subjective, personal, emotional, and embodied 
forms of knowledge production has aligned it as an “affective” methodology (see, for 
example, To, 2015), conveying visceral emotions through locating them in embodied 
experience. However, whilst Paasonen et al. (2015) argue that the use of first person stories is 
particularly suited to affective work in order to ground and situate affective experiences and 
to avoid overgeneralisation, there remain issues with the incorporation of the personal, in part 
down to the question of where the “I” in research comes from. Who is this authorial voice? 
As Butler (2005) suggests, “[t]he possibility of the ‘I,’ of speaking and knowing the ‘I,’ 
resides in a perspective that dislocates the first-person perspective it conditions” (p. 28).  She 
elaborates:
If I try to give an account of myself, if I try to make myself recognizable and 
understandable, then I might begin with a narrative account of my life. But this 
narrative will be disoriented by what is not mine, or not mine alone. And I will, to 
some degree, have to make myself substitutable in order to make myself 
recognizable. The narrative authority of the ‘I’ must give way to the perspective and 
temporality of a set of norms that contest the singularity of my story. (p. 37)
This is a claim that some might consider to destabilise the whole foundation of 
autoethnography, as it could be seen to “undermine” the voice of the data. However,  I would 
suggest that just because an “I” is unstable and partial this does not make what this “I” has to 
say any less of a valid source of data. I would continue as Sundén (2012) before me by using 
the “I” despite understanding this “I” as fractured and partial, rather than stable and whole. 
By acknowledging this partiality the research makes clear an epistemological uncertainty as 
“ways of knowing are shaky, partial, and always in the process of being proved otherwise” 
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(Sundén, 2012, p. 171). However, I would suggest that this is, and can always be, the case. 
Our understanding is always incomplete, as is our knowledge. Nevertheless, “[t]o know 
oneself as limited is still to know something about oneself, even if one’s knowing is afflicted 
by the limitation that one knows” (Butler, 2005, p. 46).
To (2015) writes that they “employ several different ‘voices’ or multiple ‘I’’s” (p. 71) 
to present an academic I, a researcher I, a subject I, and a performer I in order to weave 
together their experiences in a diasporic montage that both utilises the I and employs its 
multiplicity at once. They explain that “employing an autoethnographic performativity that 
reflexively positions the possessive ‘I’ as both locatable and unlocatable offers an intriguing 
approach […] [that] aims to subvert and blur the boundaries between subjects, human bodies, 
and mediated bodies, and motivate rethinkings of relationality, subjectivity, and affective 
processes” (To, 2015, p. 73, see also Butler, 2005). These tensions with “locatability” are 
evident through my own “I”s:
Etyme falls from a great height and I gasp. It is completely involuntary, I am in that 
moment, her, falling, perhaps to her/my death. It is a ridiculous concept because even 
if Etyme were to die I would be fine, and it would take just moments to run my spirit 
through the graveyard to find her body and resurrect. Note the my/her complications. 
The boundaries are blurred. She is not me but she is not not-me. (author, 2017, p. 12)
Autoethnography, therefore, has a complex position in terms of accounting for an “I,” 
As Grant et al. (2013) explain, at times the voice associated with autoethnography can be 
aligned with positions including “modernism, realism, positivism, phenomenology, and at a 
broader sociocultural level liberal-humanism” (p. 8). As such, an “I” might be assumed to 
speak with authority from a particular position on a subject, as ambiguity and complexity 
might be erased in a literal voice that assumes a stable and authoritative position (Grant et al. 
2013). To the contrary, Grant et al.’s (2013) position is that autoethnographies should 
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precisely account for the emergence of the “I,” as the writing of research demonstrates how 
subjectivity is produced. The voice is therefore “always provisional and contingent, always 
becoming” (Grant et al., 2013, p. 8). These arguments are aligned with a more post-
structuralist critique and approach to autoethnography, but these arguments are extended 
further in my own aim of using a posthuman autoethnography.
I, Posthuman?
As mentioned above, some of the main aspects of posthumanism lie in its disavowal of the 
liberal human aspects of autonomy, rationality, independence, and control. There are some 
versions of critical posthumanism that would extend this critique of the liberal human subject 
to argue that subjectivity is a problematic concept to theorise the posthuman condition 
through, as its roots are deeply embedded in humanism (see, for one discussion, Callus and 
Herbrechter, 2012). Herbrechter (2012) explains the critiques of writing from the position of 
“I” – ranging from Freud’s distrust of the “I” due to its influence from unconscious forces to 
Marx’s critique of the subject as being manipulated by ideologies it is unaware of. He also 
notes post-structuralism’s “radicalisation” of “these forms of suspicion, all directed against 
the idea that subjects are free and competent to give an accurate account of themselves” 
(Herbrechter, 2012, p. 331). 
There are therefore various tensions involved in studying posthuman subjectivity 
using an autoethnographic methodology. For some, the idea of posthumanism as a 
movement, turn or philosophy which acknowledges the permeability or entanglement of 
humans, the ways in which they are constantly shaped by “external” forces and stimuli, 
including the environment, the non-human, and other people, means that the idea of the “I” is 
one which is precarious and therefore writing from that position autoethnographically seems 
contradictory. How can I speak of a “me” when I know that “I” am only what my 
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entanglements make “me”? These tensions add a necessary complication to be explored 
through this article.
It is my belief that none of us are the singular, bounded subjects that liberal 
humanism would align us with. However, I do not believe it is possible at this stage to fully 
escape the overthrows of the long history of humanism that has shaped us (as entangled as I 
believe myself to be, I still speak of “I”). The “I” is the historical way in which humans have 
come to conceptualise themselves, and as such “the very terms by which we give an account, 
by which we make ourselves intelligible to ourselves and to others, are not of our making” 
(Butler, 2005, p. 21). Whilst posthumanism proposes that we critique that separateness from 
the “other,” we cannot yet state that we operate without some sense of “self” appearing, even 
from the perspective that such a self emerges from an amalgamation of components that 
collide. As Butler (2005) states, “[n]o one can live in a radically non-narratable world or 
survive a radically non-narratable life” (p. 59). I am therefore suggesting that the 
“inescapable fallacy” of the I is indeed at this moment inescapable – it is, as Deleuze (1991) 
terms it, a “grammatical fiction” but one we need (p. 95). Rather than renouncing subjectivity 
entirely then, I aim to critically extend “subjectivity” in a posthuman fashion, by 
acknowledging the multiplicity of beings that contribute to “a” subjectivity at any given time.
It is therefore not my claim that this “I” from which I write is either stable or fixed 
(see Richardson, 2005, p. 962), nor do I believe it to be free or in a position of power, nor do 
I even presume the assurance that the “I” is “me.” The fieldnotes are not an accurate 
“representation” of the experience of gaming. Instead, I use the fieldnotes in a performative 
way as an emergence of the posthuman subject. They become a performative doing – 
refuting a separation between representation and reality, this suggests a “performative” 
approach wherein the practice of writing the posthuman-“I” produces the posthuman-I (see 
Barad, 2007). Moreover, they are a posthuman construction in and of themselves, an intra-
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action of Etyme and I, as well as the laptop or phone that I write them on, which also 
becomes an integral part of their creation:
I feel the story of WoW flow far more freely between me and my laptop keyboard than 
me and the pen. My hands flying across the keyboard in the act of writing up the 
notes felt much more organic and in time with my hands flying over the keyboard in 
combat. There, faced with that same screen, the words flow freely through me to the 
machine, my mind, hands, and machine all in perfect synchronisation, writing the 
words as they come.
Furthermore, in writing the fieldnotes I “enact the self I am trying to describe” 
(Butler, 2005, p. 66). Butler explains that by utilising “I” this functions as a performative 
invocation; the “I” does something, and produces something. This questions the notion of 
that words and things are separate, and instead suggests an “entangled ontology” – we 
engage in material-discursive practices that produce different subject positions (see Barad 
2007). The fieldnotes are therefore post-anthropocentric despite their reliance on the “I,” 
through demonstrating how that posthuman I is constructed of elements of both human and 
non-human. As per Butler (2005):
I am authored by what precedes and exceeds me […] This does not mean that I 
cannot speak of such matters, but only that when I do, I must be careful to understand 
the limits of what I can do, the limits that condition any and all such doing. In this 
sense, I must become critical. (p. 81)
Although “I” am more than “me” I do not feel this should exclude writing about the “self” – 
as long as I acknowledge that self as entangled. I do not feel my material self to be a more 
influential factor than Etyme’s informational self in the posthuman subjectivity that we 
become and that the fieldnotes partially (in their own fragmented way) embody. This 
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approach aligns with recent calls for posthuman methodologies to cultivate a sensitivity to 
non-humans through a non-hierarchical approach as “one should not assume that human 
beings are necessarily the most important actor in shaping what happens within an event or 
situation” (Ash & Gallacher, 2015, p. 83). For example, Gourlay (2015) explores the material 
role of the digital device and nonhuman agency to disrupt binaries between text, author, 
device and user; whilst Allen (2018) adopts an alternative approach to posthuman writing by 
“offering some visibility upon the dynamics of inscribing and describing realities” through 
the inclusion of photographs, crossed out text, and notes in order to problematise the 
humanist self (p. 5).
Entangled with Etyme.
I am constantly being changed, affected, mediated, by those things – human and non-human 
– around me. As Butler (2005) affirms: “there is no ‘I’ that can fully stand apart from the 
social conditions of its emergence” (p. 7). Therefore, as indicated above, the fieldnotes are a 
particular aspect of the posthuman-that-is-me. Etyme and I are inseparable in our intra-action 
and in the fieldnotes: they would not exist without my intra-action with her, and they do not 
speak only of the human side of our relationship. Even when I move between different 
pronouns of “I,” “she,” and “we” the fieldnotes present a narrative that occurs only as a result 
of myself and Etyme intermingling. Pearce presents some of her research as co-authored 
between her avatar Artemesia and herself (see, for example, Pearce & Artemesia, 2009) in a 
way that is reflective of what occurs in my fieldnotes. The fieldnotes cannot escape the 
posthuman subject that they represent – or as Barad (2007) might argue, help to create. What 
I mean by this is that it is through the fieldnotes that my subjectivity with Etyme is made 
sense of and solidified, and so in some ways comes to be. The following fieldnote 
demonstrates this analytic and imaginative understanding of self:
Page 15 of 24
https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ucpress-irqr
International Review of Qualitative Research
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
16
Etyme’s not keen on the standing around admiring how good we look – there are 
things to be done out there! As I write this I realise just how much she is to me, the 
kind of life she has taken on of her own. This brings home my ambivalence to the idea 
of whether gamers game as themselves or as their characters. My argument against 
this way of thinking is that if we have already recognised that the “self” is an 
unstable and ever changing thing – what on earth makes us think that there is a 
difference between gaming as our “self” or as our “character”? Every “self” 
contains different characters already – in one day I am daughter, student, teacher, 
girlfriend, colleague, friend, customer. Just as these “selves” are entangled with 
others – daughter with my mother and father, sister with my brother, lecturer with my 
students – Etyme and I are entangled too. When Etyme and I come together we both 
become something – together.
The characterisation of Etyme is formed from an intra-action of her actions and my 
interpretations, but as described above we are each reliant on one another for that 
“something” that we are – that specific posthuman subjectivity – to occur. This is further 
enacted through the fieldnotes themselves. As Gibbs (2015) states: “[w]riting is inevitably a 
process in which subjectivity continually risks itself, finds itself, loses itself, and remakes 
itself in its dialogic relations with the worlds to which it attunes” (p. 227). This aligns with 
the notion of the fieldnotes embodying the posthuman subjectivity that emerges from my 
intra-action with Etyme. We are lost and found through the fieldnotes, the specificities of our 
individuality are constructed in relation to one other just as the subjectivity we embody 
together emerges.
Clough (2000) makes an understandable and founded critique of autoethnography, 
stating that where post-structuralism deconstructs the subject, autoethnography seems to 
insist on restoring it in order to voice experiences and emotions and claim them as one’s own. 
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However, as I have stated, in my own methodological use of autoethnography this is not an 
uncomplicated use of the subject – in “voicing” in-game experiences through the fieldnotes I 
am not aiming to claim these experiences as my own, or at least not entirely my own. I 
instead use the fieldnotes as a space to explore the entangled entities that contribute to that 
experience, as demonstrated below.
As a “hunter” in World of Warcraft I am a ranged attacker, and an enemy must be 
targeted (indicated as a glowing selection on them) in order for my attacking shots to have a 
destination. This targeting can happen automatically in game if the avatar is lined up 
correctly, otherwise it takes a click of a key on the keyboard or the mouse to make this 
selection. In the following fieldnote, I explain my frustration when trying to attack a group of 
enemies:
“I neeeed to target something first” Etyme tells me, when I am trying to tell her to 
attack and she doesn’t have an enemy engaged. I mean come on Etyme, we’re 
surrounded! Take your pick! And this is an issue of agency – sometimes in-game 
Etyme will decide to engage but mostly it is down to me. I still expect her to have 
some level of autonomy, and this “need to target” presents an annoyance at what is 
“her” and what is “me”?
Here the shifting states between Etyme and “I” is demonstrated as I again try to negotiate the 
notion of agency. In the above, although I speak of us as separate entities with differing 
responsibilities, “we” are surrounded and our distinctions are therefore fluid. But the use of 
agency above is complicated if we instead consider that “agency is a matter of intra-acting; it 
is an enactment, not something that someone or something has” (Barad, 2007, p. 178). Rather 
than either “me” or “Etyme” being individually responsible for our actions these are, as 
demonstrated by the tensions above, reliant upon our intra-action with one another. If we 
consider the avatar-gamer as a relational ontology, we can explore this as a “material-
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discursive boundary-making practice” producing “differences out of, and in terms of, a 
changing relationality” (Barad, 2007, p. 93). From this perspective what is seen as “me” and 
what is seen as “Etyme” in the above fieldnote is negotiated in reference to one another. Such 
a relationality implies a more rhizomatic relationship between human and machine, as each is 
dependent on the other in order to emerge as an entity.
As I focus specifically on the avatar-gamer relationship in my research this could be 
seen to enact a “cut” in the research. Barad (2007) explains that “entanglements are not 
isolated binary coproductions” (p. x), and it is important to note that the posthuman 
subjectivity that I am discussing is constituted by more than just these two entities of avatar 
and gamer. This subjectivity is also formed by the gameworld, including the computer being 
played on, and the other gameplayers, to name just a few of the structures and components 
that feature in the entanglement. However, by focussing on the entanglement of these entities 
the research demonstrates how an “I” is constructed and experienced in a permeable fluidity 
with a range of different external stimuli. Most explicitly this construction is demonstrated 
through relationship with the avatar, but the ways in which the fieldnotes reference other 
media and move and change between reflection, docume tation and analysis as they both 
describe and critique their descriptions also plays its part, as demonstrated below:
Rereading some of Herbrechter’s (2013) book and I am struck again by the ways in 
which some people might take offence at my research topic and methodology. Some 
might find it a contradiction – to study posthumanism, the ways in which we are not 
“one,” by using a method which is self-indulgently concerned with “I.” If I am not a 
fixed bounded subject, then from what position do I write an autoethnography? 
“The true nature of subjectivity as fragmented, contradictory and irreducible to 
conscious self-identity, ultimately remains unknowable” (Herbrechter, 2013, p. 205).
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Perhaps though this juxtaposition is what is so necessary, and missing from current 
debate. What does this posthumanism look like, feel like, to the “human” subject? 
The inescapable “I” may be a fallacy but it is precisely that - inescapable. 
The “I” with which I write this research is an intended posthuman, an “I” which is 
not just “me” but Etyme too, bound up as we are together, in this world and that. It 
fluctuates and changes between her, me, we and us as those boundaries undergo their 
“continuous construction and reconstruction” as per Hayles (1999). I am writing my-
her-our experiences.
The shifting from reflection to analysis and the reference to further texts demonstrates the 
breakdown of the author of research as all-knowing, and pays attention to the distribution of 
agency particularly in online cultures. As my fieldnotes themselves move between different 
positions of researcher, gamer, analyser etc. a fluid subjectivity is demonstrated throughout. 
The accounts therefore not only disrupt notions of human / non-human but also demonstrate 
the disruption of reflection and analysis, and “self” and “other” in scholarly work and the 
development of ideas as an entangled practice, challenging any sense of authorly authority. 
As per To (2015) “although my ‘staging’ speaks from the perspective and pronoun of ‘I’, this 
‘I’ in fact entangles the voices” – in this case of researcher, gamer, avatar, analyser, to name 
but a few (p. 73).
Conclusion
Using the avatar-gamer posthuman subjectivity as a case study, I have complicated the notion 
of the posthuman subject through the methodological implications of a posthuman “I”. I have 
considered the question of what right we have to speak from the position of an “I” if we are 
not ontologically distinct. This is undoubtedly a complex and arguably contradictory 
approach. Nevertheless, as Badmington (2003) states “the ‘post-’ of posthumanism does not 
(and, moreover, cannot) mark or make an absolute break from the legacy of humanism” (p. 
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21) and as posthuman as we might be, we are still deeply entrenched in humanistic sense-
making practices. These need to be destabilised and rethought in order to update the concepts 
to a posthuman, post-anthropocentric accounting. However, I do not think their use is 
completely at an end. The “I” is used as an indication that as entangled as we are, we are still 
embodied, and part of our entanglement is still within a humanistic practice of sense-making. 
This needs to be disrupted to consider what the “I” is, but we can reconceptualise and 
redefine without ultimately removing these notions from our vocabulary. 
Whilst “I” am not only “I” but an amalgamation based on environments, atmospheres, 
bodies, and societal, political, economic influences “I” still refer to myself as such. I am a 
posthuman-I, by my own admission and definition, yet I do not refer to myself as a collective 
nor do I disown the “I” I feel. To do so in my research would be, I believe, disingenuous, as 
it would suggest an approach that is not my lived experience. More importantly, I doubt it to 
be the lived experience of any readers of this text. Therefore, the process of using a 
posthuman-I suggested above allows us to recycle and “update” humanistic aspects of 
authorly authority, retaining the usage of “I”, but adjusting the critical and conceptual 
underpinnings that influence how we understand and interpret the self. To radically depart 
from any self-referential practices seems to be, frankly, both unlikely and ultimately 
unhelpful. Some more radical posthumanists might argue that this viewpoint only serves to 
re-establish the “I” as a locus of control and humanist accountability. However, I believe that 
using the “I” whilst understanding and recognising our entanglements, the distribution of our 
agency and the emergence of self as being contingent on “others”, becomes a critically 
reflexive practice. 
Despite its reliance on the “I” this methodology is therefore nevertheless informed by 
a form of “posthuman epistemology” by drawing on “non-human experience as site of 
knowledge” (Ferrando, 2012, p. 10) through the incorporation of the avatar and game, 
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thereby constructing knowledge that is based in posthuman experience. This links to broader 
claims that “methodological sensitivity is not an entirely human affair, and requires many 
eyes and ears – human and nonhuman – which can work with traces, gaps, absences, 
submerged narratives, and displaced actors in order to shape a form of mediated perception” 
(Blackman, 2015, p. 25). This article therefore serves as a useful example of how 
autoethnography can function in cyberspaces such as gameworlds, taking into account the 
specificities of the cyber (e.g. avatar, game, hardware, etc.) and integrating them into the 
autoethnographic practice and ultimately the research that is produced. From a posthuman 
perspective, we must account for the specific entanglements, phenomena, and subjectivities 
that arise through this cyber intra-action through those digital and machinic elements, and 
how they shape the “I” that we are.
The methodological implications of a posthuman and cyber autoethnography 
suggested in this article have therefore negotiated some of the provocations and potentials of 
using the “I” in an entangled way. The use of a posthuman-I has conceptualised and delivered 
a difficult methodology that emerges from an understanding of the tensions between these 
positions, but nevertheless justifies the posthuman-I as contingent, contradictory, and 
multiple. This provides a posthuman subject that is both radical but accessible – radical in its 
multiplicity, in the incorporation of different subject positions, and in the negotiation of an 
entanglement – but accessible in a narrative form and through the use of the “I” – that historic 
fallacy of selfhood that we nevertheless rely on to make sense of our experiences.
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